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Viewsletter

MASS, SPACE AND TIME

The So Very Little We Know: Man Has Much To Learn

It is well accepted, today, that mass, space and time are related to one another.

It is one of the essential rules that has been found, tested, and fully accepted in respect of aspects of the universe, thanks to the work of Albert Einstein's theory of general relativity.

Scientists, today, are attempting to discover much more of that which must be the rules of the universe – for they must exist, it is well accepted.

Today, it is well known that the collapse of formerly giant stars in the universe, for one reason or another, is one or more of the reasons for the creation of black holes in regions of space.

A black hole is defined as being regions in space that gravity, just beneath its surface – named formerly as 'event horizon,' is sufficiently strong that nothing – not even light – can escape.

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At the centre of a black hole – it has been given the nomenclature, 'singularity,' – but scientists, the world over, have little information of this point, being infinitively small and infinitively dense.

Scientists are well aware that they know very little about the universe, how stars are created and, seemingly, how stars 'die,' and why and how, try as they may, it might be many billions of eons for them ever to learn how giant stars were – and are – created – as we know them, today – and what, if any, there are life forms – as we know them in man's thinking, today – on some or the many millions of stars, about which they know absolutely nothing.

Many of the aspects, mentioned above – and there must be many more aspects, of course – might be likened to that which many world-be loguacious scientists and economists try to make seemingly determinations which, to some degree, seem to have quintessential aspects, whereas that which they make claims that, to a very great degree, are, at best, garrulous.

The following are some of the aspects about which man acknowledges in that which are thought to be today's great pool of man's simplicity knowledge, compared to that of the empty void of the universe yet to be understood.

Part Twenty-One

WILL YOU WONT YOU WILL YOU JOIN THE DANCE?

Of late, a confabulation has come to be known: Now it is called The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO).

The confabulation comprises, inter alia, leading autocrats, all of whom seem to be desirous of seeking to come closer together, closer than ever before.

Since the concept of the SCO was first established, some 24 years ago, it had never been completely that which could be said was impactful.

Be that which it was in the past, it does appear, today, that the SCO is somewhat akin to the BRICS, a group of emerging economies, comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa.

Today, the SCO appears to somewhat differential from the BRICS due to certain situations that have come to pass in the midst of time.

Today, things are quite different from the past, with President Xi Jin Ping (习近平), of The People's Republic of China (PRC), and President Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, of The Russian Federation, having successfully wooing Prime Minister Narendra Modi, of The Republic of India, to see things a little different from the past.

It could be said that President Donald John Trump, of The United States of America, had, unwittingly, been a singular factor for the present success of wooing Prime Minister Narendra Modi to come to the SCO party.

Doctor Michael Froman Explains

Doctor Michael Froman, the President of The Council On Foreign Relations, had the following to declare:

'The trouble began in June 2025, when President Donald Trump claimed publicly and in a direct phone call with Prime Minister Narendra Modi that he personally brokered a ceasefire between New Delhi and Islamabad.

'India has long rejected any notion of external mediation with its neighbour, and Modi has yet to nominate Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize, unlike his Pakistani counterpart.

'Then, Trump imposed 50 percent punitive secondary tariffs on India (and only India) as a punishment for the country's continued import of Russian oil — despite China, Turkey, and other nations, purchasing substantial quantities of the very same oil from Russian firms.

'Evidently, the President was particularly disturbed that, while China increased Russian oil imports for its own use, India was reselling refined Russian oil products to Europe and elsewhere for a healthy profit.

'These actions sent the U.S.-India relationship into a diplomatic free fall.

'It culminated on a red carpet in Tianjin, where Xi, Modi, and Putin strode together, awkwardly holding hands, beaming for the cameras.

'In an aside at the summit, Xi went so far as to proclaim that it is, "time for the dragon and elephant to dance together."

'Modi's nascent embrace of Xi and warmer relations with China fly in the face of a multi-decade effort, spanning five American presidencies, to court India as a long-term partner with whom the United States could work to offset China's immense industrial capacity, technological prowess, and increasing military capabilities.

'Strong U.S.-India relations have been one of the few, enduring bipartisan foreign policy designs of the past three decades.

'I remember the shockwaves in 2008 when President George W. Bush and Indian Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, signed the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement, which marked the separation of India's civil and military nuclear facilities, compliance with the rules of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and most importantly, civil nuclear cooperation between the two powers.

'More recently, the United States (of America) has developed strong defence and technology partnerships, particularly in artificial intelligence (AI) and aerospace, including the U.S.-India initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology (i-CET) and the India-U.S. Defence Acceleration Ecosystem (INDUS-X).

'And at the centre of this strategic alignment stands the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, better known as The Quad, a coalition of the Australia, India, Japan, and The United States of America, that has moved from quiet consultation to joint naval exercises, intelligence sharing, and coordination on emerging technologies — all to counterbalance China's growing threat to a free and open Indo-Pacific.

'As former Deputy Secretary of State, Mr Kurt M. Campbell, and former National Security Adviser, Mr Jake Sullivan, wrote in a new piece for Foreign Affairs, the U.S.-India relationship "has been one of the brightest spots of bipartisan support in a divided Washington where concerted international purpose has been in short supply."

'These initiatives are, now, likely to lose momentum, and the costs to trust in the relationship may be quite steep.

'India is a proud country, and Trump is a proud President. Not an ideal combination.

'As Trump posted, "Looks like we've lost India and Russia to deepest, darkest China. May they have a long and prosperous future together!"

'But while it is definitely a setback, it might not represent a tectonic and permanent geopolitical shift. The underlying national interests of each country remain the same.

'First of all, we should not overstate the breadth and depth of the existing U.S.-India strategic relationship.

'At risk is more the potential, the progress, and the direction of travel. It was never a military alliance. And some of us were surprised and sceptical when (the) Trump Administration officials talked publicly a couple months ago about how close we were to a major trade agreement, given India's historic protectionism and trade obstructionism.

'On the other hand, Modi's China pivot is hardly a like-for-like replacement for the potential of the U.S.-India strategic relationship.

'India-China ties are plagued by a number of historically intractable problems that transcend handholding on the sidelines of the SCO Summit: The two countries' intergenerational dispute over the Dalai Lama, ill will from deadly border clashes in the Galwan Valley, and lingering resentment from the 1962 border war.

'There are currently no direct flights between India and China (though they may resume soon); the most popular Chinese apps, including TikTok, have been banned by the Modi Government, as were China's leading state-backed telecommunications firms Huawei and ZTE.

'The country that most closely rivals the United States' neuralgia about Chinese imports is India; it fears the impact of Chinese dumping on its still nascent manufacturing capabilities.

'Beyond territorial skirmishes, economic tensions, and historical perfidy, New Delhi knows that Beijing's economic grand strategy of export-led growth, cozy relationship with Islamabad, and drive for military primacy in the Indo-Pacific do not bode well for the security and prosperity of over 1.4 billion Indians.

'So where do we go from here?'

'India is no stranger to being cajoled — or courted — by rival superpowers. During the Cold War, it staked its claim as the vanguard of the non-aligned movement, not just for the sake of neutrality, but as means of leverage.

'As former Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru once declared, "We propose, as far as possible, to keep away from the power politics of groups, aligned against one another, which have led in the past to world wars and which may again lead to disasters on an even vaster scale."

'With those words, India declared its commitment to geopolitical polyamory and carefully guarded its freedom of manoeuvre, even as Moscow and Washington circled for advantage.

'For the most part, Nehru's doctrine worked. India broke free of the non-proliferation regime, avoided costly entanglements, and balanced deftly between the former Soviet Union, China, and the United States of America for almost fifty years.

'Non-alignment sentiments are still alive and well as a policy construct in New Delhi, and Trump may well cement its return. We must remember that the past three decades of warming U.S.-India ties represented a unique departure from India's more standoffish strategy for much of the post-war period.

'As Indian Minister of External Affairs, Mr S. Jaishankar, quipped to the Financial Times, earlier this year, "I think the virtues of the old order are somewhat exaggerated... India wants something more than evolutionary, but which is comfortable and steady. But it has to reflect the world as it is now and not as it was post-1945 when the rules were weighted in favour of the West."

'Yet mechanisms like the SCO and BRICS lack the teeth and broad-based incentive alignment to bring about a truly multipolar order or materially disrupt the existing system. The cordiality on display in Tianjin rarely extends to the type of functional cooperation that defines the most effective international organizations, such as NATO.

'As the unipolar moment fades into the rearview, India's navigation between China, Russia, and The United States of America offers an interesting window in the dynamics of the order to come.

'The bipolar and multipolar concepts that are so often forecast to take hold fail to capture the complexity and volatility of the current geopolitical landscape.

'Rising and middle powers, including India and the major Gulf states, have the capacity and strategic incentives to resist having to choose between one partner and another. India is truly the archetype of the geopolitically polyamorous.

'This new era is less likely to be defined by traditional notions of bipolarity or multipolarity than by fragmentation and plurilateralism: Overlapping groups of like-minded countries working together on certain sets of issues — whether that is on trade, technology or security — outside the structure of existing multilateral fora.

'What remains to be seen is whether these coalitions of the ambitious will form with, around, or despite The United States of America.'

CRUNCH !

The Securities and Futures Commission (SFC) (證券及期貨事務監察委員會) has banned Mr Suen Kin Wing (孫健榮), a former Associate Director of UBS AG (瑞士銀行), from re-entering the industry for life in light of his criminal convictions for money laundering and committal for Contempt of Court (Note 1).

The case arose from Mr Suen Kin Wing's role as the Client Advisor of two Mainland Chinese clients who held a joint account with UBS (Joint Account).

Since the clients encountered difficulties in remitting RMB from the Mainland to Hongkong, they entered into an arrangement with Mr Suen Kin Wing to facilitate cross-boundary fund transfers.

Under the arrangement, Mr Suen Kin Wing would transfer funds into Mainland bank accounts, designated by Mr Suen Kin Wing, and, thereafter, the funds would be remitted to Hongkong to be deposited into the Joint Account.

All in all, the clients transferred over RMB132 million to Mr Suen Kin Wing's designated Mainland accounts, between November 2016 and February 2018.

Although Mr Suen Kin Wing provided transaction confirmations and bank statements, which purported to show that the remitted funds had been deposited into the Joint Account, the clients, subsequently, discovered that a significant proportion of the transferred money was missing.

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It transpired that, during the material time, deposits, totalling over \$HK134 million, had been diverted into two Hongkong bank accounts, belonging to Mr Suen Kin Wing.

The Court found that the diverted deposits were (the) crime proceeds, being sums (of money) which Mr Suen Kin Wing had defrauded, or stolen, from the clients.

The Court, also, found that Mr Suen Kin Wing had used the stolen proceeds to maintain a lavish lifestyle, spending them on his purchases of luxury vehicles and numerous properties in The United Kingdom (UK) and Mainland China.

The Court of First Instance sentenced Mr Suen Kin Wing to 10 years' imprisonment on June 21, 2024, following his guilty pleas to two counts of dealing with property, known or believed, to represent proceeds of indictable offence (Note 2).

Meanwhile, the two clients obtained a worldwide freezing injunction against Mr Suen Kin Wing in July 2018, as part of their legal action in order to recover the misappropriated sums of money.

Specifically, Mr Suen Kin Wing was prohibited from, amongst other things, disposing of, or dealing with, any of his assets up to the value of HK\$130 million.

However, Mr Suen Kin Wing assigned his interest in a number of the UK Properties to a BVI company, owned by him, in breach of the injunction.

As a result, Mr Suen Kin Wing was sentenced by the Court of First Instance on December 20, 2023, to six months' imprisonment on account of his Contempt of Court (Note 3).

In the circumstances, the SFC considers that Mr Suen Kin Wing is (a) not fit and proper to be a regulated person.

Notes:

1. Mr Suen Kin Wing was a relevant individual, engaged by UBS to carry on Type 1 (Dealing in Securities) and Type 4 (advising on securities) regulated activities under The Securities and Futures Ordinance between January 14, 2014, and June 5, 2018. Mr Suen Kin Wing is, currently, not registered with the Hong Kong Monetary Authority or licensed by the SFC.
2. The Reasons for Sentence for this case (Case Number: HCCC 77/2021) is available on the Judiciary's website.
3. The Decisions and Judgments from the contempt proceedings (Case Number: HCMP 633/2019) are available on the Judiciary's website.

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