

TARGET

Intelligence Report

VOLUME XXVII No. 212

W E D N E S D A Y

November 12, 2025

Viewsletter

MASS. SPACE AND TIME

The So Very Little We Know: Man Has Much To Learn

It is well accepted, today, that mass, space and time are related to one another.

It is one of the essential rules that has been found, tested, and fully accepted in respect of aspects of the universe, thanks to the work of Albert Einstein's theory of general relativity.

Scientists, today, are attempting to discover much more of that which must be the rules of the universe — for they must exist, it is well accepted.

Today, it is well known that the collapse of formerly giant stars in the universe, for one reason or another, is one or more of the reasons for the creation of black holes in regions of space.

A black hole is defined as being regions in space that gravity, just beneath its surface — named formerly as 'event horizon,' is sufficiently strong that nothing — not even light — can escape.

Printed by: TARGET Newspapers Ltd

Suite 2905, 29th Floor, Bank of America Tower, Number 12, Harcourt Road, Central, Hongkong.

Telephone Number: 2573-0379 Facsimile Number: 2838-1597 E-Mail Address: editor@targetnewspapers.com

TARGET Website Address: www.targetnewspapers.com

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED IN ANY FORM OR MANNER IN PART OR AS A WHOLE WITHOUT PRIOR WRITTEN LICENCE OF THE PUBLISHER

At the centre of a black hole — it has been given the nomenclature, 'singularity,' — but scientists, the world over, have little information of this point, being infinitively small and infinitively dense.

Scientists are well aware that they know very little about the universe, how stars are created and, seemingly, how stars 'die,' and why and how, try as they may, it might be many billions of eons for them ever to learn how giant stars were — and are — created — as we know them, today — and what, if any, there are life forms — as we know them in man's thinking, today — on some or the many millions of stars, about which they know absolutely nothing.

Many of the aspects, mentioned above — and there must be many more aspects, of course — might be likened to that which many world-be loquacious scientists and economists try to make seemingly determinations which, to some degree, seem to have quintessential aspects, whereas that which they make claims that, to a very great degree, are, at best, garrulous.

The following are some of the aspects about which man acknowledges in that which are thought to be today's great pool of man's simplicity knowledge, compared to that of the empty void of the universe yet to be understood.

Part Nine

Texas Instruments Incorporated (TI) is an American multinational semiconductor company, headquartered in Dallas, Texas, The United States of America.

It is one of the top 10 semiconductor companies worldwide, based on sales volume.

The company's focus is on developing analogue chips and embedded processors, which account for more than 80 percent of its total revenue.

TI, also, produces digital light processing (DLP) technology and education technology products, including calculators, microcontrollers, and multi-core processors.

On June 24, 2025, it was announced that TI had pledged an historic of more than \$US60 billion investments in The United States of America.

The announcement, also, stated that President Donald Trump had determined to exert pressure on big technology corporate entities, engaged in the manufacture, as well as to increase functionalities in The United States of America, meaning that such corporations, as the likes of TI, should not stray out of the distinct territory within defined American borders.

The following paragraphs are TI's public announcement, indicating as to this company's determinations, decisively and conclusively, within this corporation's promise to the Government of The United States of America:

*'Computer chip giant, **Texas Instruments (TI)**, will invest more than \$60 billion in the US, as President Donald Trump has pressured big technology firms to increase manufacturing in the country.*

'The company said it plans to build or expand seven chip-making facilities at three sites in Texas and Utah, which shall (eventually) create 60,000 jobs. TI did not give a detailed timeline for the investment.

'The Dallas-based firm described the move as the "largest investment in foundational semiconductor manufacturing in US history."

*'It follows similar announcements from others manufacturing semiconductors, including Micron (**Micron Technology Incorporated**), which said ... that it would increase its planned spending in the US to \$US200 billion.*

'President Trump has made it a priority to increase semiconductor manufacturing in America," US Secretary of Commerce, Mr Howard Lutnick, announced recently.

'Our partnership with TI will support US chip manufacturing for decades to come," Mr Howard Lutnick stated.

'Like some other companies that unveiled major spending pledges, TI's announcement includes money already earmarked to either build or expand facilities.

'Some analysts have said that they see such major spending announcements as attempts to placate Trump (President Donald Trump).

'The President has repeatedly threatened to cancel the \$US52.70 billion CHIPS and Science Act, which was introduced by his predecessor, former President Joe Biden.

'... the Biden Administration finalised a \$1.60-billion subsidy for TI after it announced plans to invest at least \$18 billion to build three new facilities.

'Trump has, also, warned of potential new tariffs on imports of semiconductors.

*'Unlike artificial intelligence chip companies, such as the likes of Nvidia (**Nvidia Corporation**), Texas Instruments makes so-called foundational chips, which are used in various devices, including smartphones and cars.*

'The company operates 15 sites around the world, including facilities in the US and Asia. It counts iPhone-maker Apple, Elon Musk's rocket firm SpaceX, and motor industry giant, Ford, amongst its customers.

'Texas Instruments has faced increasing competition from Chinese manufacturers of these lower-end chips.'

Those Selected Ladies and Gentlemen

On a certain number of televised programmes, promulgated widely in The **Hongkong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR)** of The **People's Republic of China (PRC)**, where it was claimed that the members of four or five of those people that had been carefully selected to take their seats, with a Master/Mistress of Ceremonies, conducting suggestive matters of pith and moment, were claimed to be well knowledgeable in respect of certain subjects – mostly matters of the day – clouded with more pith than moment, however.

As the programmes continued for about one hour or so, the carefully selected ladies and gentlemen had been allowed to have their say, with agreed smiles, determined by the Master/Mistress of Ceremonies, with nods of acceptability from time to time.

Many of the determinations of the carefully selected ladies and gentlemen, resulted in excessive talkative banter, laced with jocular giggles of those who, only, appeared to be listening, and, then, the more than likely, criticisms of actions and/or statements of some of the said to be the most-senior elected governmental individuals of The United States of America, sans Hongkong Government individuals, (naturally) that have been presented with their unique positions to sit in some of the highest levels of Hongkong Government in order to control and conduct the actions of seven million-plus individuals, resident in the 416 square miles that constitute the Hongkong of the day.

That which was readily apparent, during one or more of the ladies/gentlemen '*orations*,' was that there was never a suggestive perceived complaint about the actions – or lack of actions – of the governing persons that, daily, warmed their seats of those in power.

The Government Of The United States of America Attacks Iran

On Saturday, June 21, 2025, US forces attacked three Iranian nuclear and military sites, raising the stakes in the Israel-Iran War.

The Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran confirmed that there had been attacks at its Natanz, Fordow, and Isfahan sites.

The attacks were, initially, said to have been dastardly successful.

Before the bombing mission, Washington had assisted Israel to shoot down incoming Iranian missiles.

Dr Michael Froman, the President, Council on Foreign Relations, put pen to paper, once again.

The following determinations are those which have been extrapolated in the thinking of Dr Michael Froman's.

In the Middle East, Israel and Iran were engaged in what could be the most consequential conflict in the region since the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The **Council on Foreign Relations (CFR's)** experts continue to cover all aspects of the evolving conflict.

While the situation evolved, including the potential for direct involvement by The United States of America, it is worth touching on another recent development in the region, which could have far-reaching consequences: The diffusion of cutting-edge U.S. artificial intelligence (**AI**) technology to leading Gulf powers.

Artificial Intelligence (AI) President Donald Trump Technology, And Innovation

The defining feature of President Donald Trump's foreign policy is his willingness to question and, in many cases, reject the prevailing consensus on matters, ranging from European security, to trade.

His approach to AI policy is no exception.

Less than six months into his second term, President Donald Trump had set to rewrite, fundamentally, the United States' international AI strategy in ways that could influence the balance of global power for decades to come.

CFR President, Mr Michael Froman, analyses the most important foreign policy story of the week. Plus, get the latest news and insights from the Council's experts.

In February, at the Artificial Intelligence Action Summit in Paris, Vice President JD Vance delivered a rousing speech at the Grand Palais, and made it clear that the Trump Administration planned to abandon the Biden Administration's safety-centric approach to AI governance in favour of a laissez-faire regulatory regime.

'The AI future is not going to be won by hand-wringing about safety,' Vice President JD Vance said.

He continued by stating:

'It will be won by building – from reliable power plants to the manufacturing facilities that can produce the chips of the future.'

And as Trump's AI '**czar**,' Mr David Sacks, put it:

'Washington wants to control things, the bureaucracy wants to control things. That's not a winning formula for technology development. We've got to let the private sector cook.'

The accelerationist thrust of Vance's and Sacks's remarks is manifesting on a global scale.

The previous month, during President Donald Trump's tour of the Middle East, The United States of America announced a series of deals to permit The United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia to import huge quantities (potentially more than one million units) of advanced AI chips to be housed in massive new data centers that will serve U.S. and Gulf AI firms that are training and operating cutting-edge models.

These imports were made possible by the Trump Administration's decision to scrap a Biden Administration Executive Order that capped chip exports to geopolitical swing states in the Gulf and beyond, and which represents the most significant proliferation of AI capabilities outside The United States of America and The People's Republic of China to date.

*While **targetnewspapers.com** makes every attempt to ensure accuracy of all data published, **targetnewspapers.com** cannot be held responsible for any errors and/or omissions.*

The recipe for building and operating cutting-edge AI models has a few key raw ingredients: Training data; algorithms (the governing logic of AI models such as ChatGPT); advanced chips, such as **Graphics Processing Units (GPUs)** or **Tensor Processing Units (TPUs)** – and massive, power-hungry data centres filled with advanced chips.

Today, The United States of America maintains a monopoly of only one of these inputs: Advanced semiconductors, and more specifically, the design of advanced semiconductors – a field in which U.S. tech giants, such as Nvidia Corporation and **Advanced Micro Devices, Incorporation (AMD)**. AMD remain far ahead of their global competitors.

To weaponise this chokepoint, the first Trump Administration and the Biden Administration placed a series of ever-stricter export controls on the sale of advanced U.S.-designed AI chips to countries of concern, including China.

The semiconductor export control regime, culminated in the final days of the Biden Administration, with the rollout of the Framework for Artificial Intelligence Diffusion, more commonly known as the AI diffusion rule – a comprehensive global framework for limiting the proliferation of advanced semiconductors.

The rule sorted the world into three camps: Tier One countries, including core U.S. allies, such as Australia, Japan, and The United Kingdom, were exempt from restrictions, whereas Tier Three countries, such as Russia, China, and Iran, were subject to the extremely stringent controls.

The core controversy of the diffusion rule stemmed from the Tier Two bucket, which included some 150 countries, including India, Mexico, Israel, Switzerland, Saudi Arabia, and The United Arab Emirates. Many Tier Two states, particularly Gulf powers with deep economic and military ties to The United States, were furious.

The rule wasn't just a matter of how many chips could be imported and by whom. It refashioned how The United States of America could steer the distribution of computing resources, including the regulation and real-time monitoring of their deployment abroad and the terms by which the technologies can be shared with third parties.

Proponents of the restrictions pointed to the need to limit geopolitical swing states' access to leading AI capabilities and to prevent Chinese, Russian, and other adversarial actors from accessing powerful AI chips by contracting cloud service providers in these swing states.

However, critics of the rule, including leading AI model developers and cloud service providers, claimed that the constraints would stifle U.S. innovation and incentivise Tier Two countries to adopt Chinese AI infrastructure.

Moreover, critics argued that with domestic capital expenditures on AI development and infrastructure running into the hundreds of billions of dollars in 2025 alone, fresh capital and scale-up opportunities in the Gulf and beyond represented the most viable option for expanding the U.S. AI ecosystem.

This hypothesis was about to be tested in real time.

In May, the Trump Administration killed the diffusion rule, days before it would have been set into motion, in part to facilitate the export of these cutting-edge chips abroad to the Gulf powers.

This represents a fundamental pivot for AI policy, but potentially, also, in the logic of U.S. grand strategy vis-à-vis China.

The most recent era of great power competition, the Cold War, was fundamentally bipolar and The United States of America leaned heavily on the principle of non-proliferation, particularly in the nuclear domain, to limit the possibility of new entrants.

We are, now, playing by a new set of rules where the diffusion of U.S. technology – and an effort to box out Chinese technology – is of paramount importance.

Perhaps, maintaining and expanding The United States' global market share in key AI chokepoint technologies will deny China the scale it needs to outcompete The United States of America – but it, also, introduces the risk of U.S. chips, falling into the wrong hands via transshipment, smuggling, and other means, or being co-opted by authoritarian regimes for malign purposes.

Such risks are not illusory: There is, already, ample evidence of Chinese firms, using shell entities, to access leading-edge U.S. chips through cloud service providers in Southeast Asia.

And Chinese firms, including Huawei, were important vendors for leading Gulf AI firms, including the UAE's G-42, until the U.S. Government forced the firm to divest its Chinese hardware as a condition for receiving a strategic investment from Microsoft in 2024.

In The United States of America, the ability to build new data centres is severely constrained by complex permitting processes and limited capacity to bring new power to the grid.

What the Gulf countries lack in terms of semiconductor prowess and AI talent, they make up for with abundant capital, energy, and accommodating regulations.

The Gulf countries are well-positioned for massive AI infrastructure buildouts. The question is simply, using whose technology – American or Chinese – and on what terms?

In Saudi Arabia and the UAE, it will be American technology for now.

The question remains whether (or not) the diffusion of the most powerful dual-use technologies of our day will bind foreign users to The United States of America; and, what impact it will have on the global balance of power.

*

*

*

The Good, The Bad and The Ugly

You Will Find Them All In TARGET

For Subscription: info@targetnewspapers.com

Facsimile: 2838-1597